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THE TAXATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: SOME POLICY
QUESTIONS STIMULATED BY THE
"CHECK-THE-BOx" REGULATIONS
George K. Yin*
ITH remarkable speed, the Internal Revenue Service has pro-
posed and now implemented a brand-new system for the classi-
fication of business firms for tax purposes. Under the new
procedure, commonly referred to as the "check-the-box" regulations,
many private firms, no matter what their characteristics under state law,
may choose the set of rules that will control how the income of the firm is
taxed.1 Thus far, the check-the-box approach has been greeted with en-
thusiasm and widely praised as an important, simplifying improvement in
the tax law. 2 In this Article, I argue that such praise is very premature,
and that several important policy questions need to be resolved before we
can accurately gauge the wisdom of the new rule. There is also serious
debate whether the check-the-box regulations will ultimately prove to be
a simplifying change in the law.
Part I of this Article briefly sketches out the background behind the
check-the-box regulations. Part II presents a series of policy issues raised
by the new regulations and some of the reasons why one might doubt
whether the change will constitute a simplifying one. Part III provides a
detailed illustration of one of the difficult questions made more signifi-
cant by the check-the-box regulations-the proper allocation of "nonre-
* Harrison Foundation Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia. The au-
thor is co-reporter along with Professor David Shakow to the American Law Institute's
Federal Income Tax Project on the Taxation of Pass-Through Entities. Portions of this
Article have been drawn from drafts and discussions undertaken in connection with that
project. None of the views expressed here, however, should be attributed to the ALI,
Professor Shakow, or any of the consultants to the project. The author is greatly indebted
to Professor Shakow for his close and continuing collaboration on the project and his
assistance in preparing this Article.
1. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1, -2, -3 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Hugh M. Dougan et al., 'Check-the-Box'-Looking under the Lid, 75 TAX
NOTES 1141, 1155 (1997) ("The regulations clearly are a bold effort to fashion a simpler
and more administrable classification system for the future."); Victor E. Fleischer, "If It
Looks Like A Duck:" Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box, 71 TAX NOTES 345, 366
(1996); Michael J. Grace, Proposed "Check-the-Box" Regulations Would Streamline But
Not Eliminate Entity Classification Process, 37 TAX MGMT. (BNA) 295, 295 (1996); Roger
F. Pillow et al., Check-the-Box Proposed Regs. Simplify the Entity Classification Process, 85
J. TAX'N 72, 72 (1996); Michael L. Schler, Initial Thoughts on the Proposed 'Check-the-Box'
Regulations, 71 TAX NoTEs 1679, 1681 (1996).
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course deductions" among the owners of a private business firm. Part IV
contains a brief conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND
Under current law, the income of firms engaged in general business
activities may be taxed under one of three possible sets of tax rules. In
general, incorporated firms are taxed under Subchapters C or S of the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code). Unincorporated firms not treated as
corporations are generally taxed under Subchapter K. There are many
differences in these sets of rules, and it is often advantageous for a firm to
be taxed under one set rather than another. 3
Prior to the check-the-box regulations, the taxation of a firm's income
was based largely on the state law characteristics of the firm. In general,
incorporated firms as well as unincorporated firms that "resembled" cor-
porations because they had a sufficient number of corporate characteris-
tics-centralized management, continuous life apart from the lives of the
owners of the firm, free transferability of ownership interests, and limited
liability for the owners from the activities and debts of the business-
were treated as corporations for tax purposes. Therefore, both incorpo-
rated and unincorporated firms resembling corporations were subject to
either Subchapters C or S.4 Unincorporated firms without enough of
those characteristics were generally treated as partnerships and taxed
under Subchapter K.5
Over the years, the implementation by the IRS of the "corporate re-
semblance" classification test was greatly criticized.6 For example, the
regulations required a straightforward, numerical counting of the corpo-
rate characteristics of the firm, without any evaluation of the importance
of each characteristic in the particular case, to determine whether an un-
incorporated entity should be classified as a corporation for tax pur-
3. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
4. See former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993).
5. See id.; former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 1993).
6. See William B. Brannan, Lingering Partnership Classification Issues (Just When
You Thought It Was Safe To Go Back into the Water), 1 FLA. TAX REV. 197, 261 (1993);
Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Liability Companies: Law in Search of
Policy, 50 Bus. LAw. 995, 1000, 1006 (1995); Patrick Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One
Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (1995); David R. Keyser, Publicly
Traded Limited Partnerships: The Treasury Fights the Wrong War, 27 TAX NoTEs 527, 531
(1985); Fred W. Peel, Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions on an Old Issue, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 989, 990; Philip F. Postlewaite et al., A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income
Tax Project-Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423, 458-
59 (1986); Stephen B. Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and
Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REV. 603, 709-10 (1965); John J. Sexton & Donald F. Osteen,
Classification as a Partnership or as an Association Taxable as a Corporation, 24 TUL. TAX
INST. 95, 96-97 (1975); Joseph A. Snoe, Entity Classification Under the Internal Revenue
Code: A Proposal to Replace the Resemblance Model, 15 J. CORP. L. 647, 652 (1990).
[Vol. 51
1997] TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 127
poses.7 In Larson v. Commissioner,8 the Tax Court felt constrained by
this directive to conclude that a limited partnership should not be classi-
fied as a corporation for tax purposes, and strongly suggested that the
IRS might want to revise its regulations to change this wooden interpreta-
tion of the statute.9
Additionally, the regulations sometimes incorporated an artificial in-
terpretation of the meaning of the various factors. Consider, for exam-
ple, the meaning of "limited liability," a characteristic viewed by many as
a fundamental distinction between corporations and partnerships. In
general, corporations have this characteristic, but general partnerships do
not. But is the characteristic present in a limited partnership? The regu-
lations dealt with this issue by saying that limited liability is present only
if "there is no member" liable for the entity's debts, thereby generally
treating a limited partnership as lacking that corporate characteristic.' 0
The regulations then acknowledged, however, that a limited partnership
might have limited liability if its general partner, the only partner liable
for the entity's debts, lacked substantial assets. 1
Unfortunately, before reaching that conclusion, the regulations also re-
quired a finding that the general partner constituted a mere "dummy"
acting as the agent of the limited partners.'2 As the Court of Claims ex-
plained in Zuckman v. United States,13 this additional requirement effec-
tively made it impossible for any limited partnership to have the limited
liability characteristic because, if the general partner were a "dummy" in
that sense, the limited partners would be personally liable under state law
for the debts of the entity.14 In other words, because someone-either
the limited partners or the general partner-would be liable for the en-
tity's debts in all cases considered by the regulations, a limited partner-
ship could not have limited liability. 15
7. See former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1993) ("[A]n unincorpo-
rated organization shall not be classified as an association [and therefore be taxable as a
corporation] unless such organization has more corporate characteristics than
noncorporate characteristics.").
8. 66 T.C. 159, 175-76, 185-86 (1976).
9. The IRS made two attempts to revise the regulations, but both efforts were unsuc-
cessful. See 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977); 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980).
10. Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1993) (emphasis added).
11. See Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1993).
12. See id.
13. 524 F.2d 729, 741 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
14. See former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1993) ("Notwithstanding
the formation of the organization as a limited partnership, when the limited partners act as
the principals of [a 'dummy'] general partner, personal liability will exist with respect to
such limited partners.").
15. But see Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 197-98 (1976) (Simpson, J., dissent-
ing). The language of the regulation actually was somewhat ambiguous regarding whether
a corporate general partner had to lack substantial assets and be a mere dummy in order
for the limited partnership to be treated as having limited liability. See former Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1993); STEPHEN UTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 34 n.76 (3d ed. 1995).
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During the time the corporate resemblance regulations were in effect,
important changes began taking place at the state level. In 1977, Wyo-
ming became the first state to adopt a limited liability company (LLC) act
and it was followed by Florida five years later.16 The special feature of
these laws was to ensure that mere ownership of an LLC did not expose
an owner, termed a "member," to personal liability for the LLC's debts,
much like the protection afforded the shareholders of a corporation.
Moreover, just like shareholders but unlike the limited partners of a part-
nership, LLC members could generally be actively involved in the activi-
ties of the business. The initial reaction of the IRS was to classify LLCs
as corporations for tax purposes, 17 but that position was soon withdrawn
and ultimately replaced by a ruling holding that a Wyoming LLC could
be classified as a partnership.' 8 That ruling opened the floodgates, as
state after state proceeded to adopt LLC statutes of their own, and the
IRS proceeded to issue classification rulings applicable to other state pro-
visions consistent with the conclusions of its Wyoming ruling. 19 At pres-
ent, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted LLC acts.
It was against this backdrop that the IRS issued Notice 95-1420 an-
nouncing the Service's willingness to consider permitting the classifica-
tion question to be resolved through an explicit taxpayer election. The
impetus behind the notice was the IRS's realization that the existing clas-
sification standards had become meaningless, and that taxpayers could
achieve partnership tax status under them for organizations "virtually in-
distinguishable" from a corporation.21 Accordingly, the Service con-
cluded that an explicit taxpayer election would accomplish the same
substantive outcome but with reduced transaction costs for both taxpay-
ers and the government.22
The final regulations, effective January 1, 1997, implement the elective
approach. In general, domestic business entities may elect to be treated
as either a corporation or a partnership for tax purposes. 23 There are two
principal categories of firms which are ineligible for the election and au-
tomatically taxed as corporations: (1) firms incorporated under state law
and (2) those classified by statute as a corporation, such as a publicly
traded partnership. 24 Thus, a firm not excepted from the election, such as
16. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 (Michie 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608-401
(West 1993).
17. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980), withdrawn, 48
Fed. Reg. 14,389 (1983).
18. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
19. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (Delaware LLC may be classified as
partnership for federal tax purposes.).
20. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 298.
23. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1996).
24. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) and (7) (1996). Both of these exceptions appar-
ently result from the limited scope of the IRS's authority to change the classification rules.
The IRS could not allow state law corporations to make the election because of all of the
specific Code provisions applicable to "corporations." See, e.g., I.R.C. § 11(a) (1994 &
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an LLC, has the option of being taxed under either Subchapter C, Sub-
chapter S (assuming the eligibility requirements for that subchapter can
be satisfied and an S election is made), or Subchapter K.
II. SOME POLICY QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE CHECK-THE-
BOX REGULATIONS
This part briefly discusses a series of policy questions left unresolved by
the adoption of the check-the-box regulations. In summary, the ques-
tions relate to whether an elective approach is appropriate at all (ques-
tion A), who should be entitled to make the election if one is provided
(questions B and C), and what operating rule choices should be available
to those making the election (questions D and E).
A. SHOULD THE INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESs FIRMs BE
DETERMINED BY EXPLICIT TAXPAYER ELECTION?
As noted, the principal argument of the IRS in favor of an explicit elec-
tion was that the law had evolved to the point where there was no longer
any meaningful classification standard to enforce. Therefore, it was best
to drop the pretense of an existing standard, thereby saving taxpayers the
cost of seeking out pro forma classification rulings and saving the IRS the
cost of issuing those rulings. An election also eliminated the need for
state legislators to design statutes authorizing the formation of unincor-
porated entities with the former classification regulations in mind.
Rather, state statutes could be designed with the objective of creating the
most optimal, economic form of business organization.
Interestingly, the IRS's resignation regarding the state of prior law did
not differentiate between a nonexistent standard for classifying business
entities for tax purposes and an existing one which was simply not being
implemented effectively. One view is that there is a valid basis for distin-
guishing between corporations and partnerships for tax purposes, perhaps
along the lines of the state law characteristics of the entity, such as limited
liability, or other factors.2 5 Under this view, the problem with the former
Supp. 1 1996) (imposing an entity tax on the income of "every corporation"), and I.R.C.
§§ 1361-63, 1366-68, 1371-78 (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (excusing "small business corporations"
from the entity-level tax but subjecting them to a specific set of tax rules). Thus, the IRS's
regulatory reach was limited to interpreting the meaning of unincorporated "associations"
which, under the statute, are to be treated as corporations for tax purposes. See id.
§ 7701(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. I 1996). Under the check-the-box regulations, the IRS's an-
swer is to permit an unincorporated domestic firm to decide for itself whether it is an
association taxable as a corporation. At the same time, because of section 7704(a), the IRS
did not have authority to allow a partnership with publicly traded ownership interests to
make the election. Even given the limited reach of the new regulations, some commenta-
tors have questioned whether there is adequate statutory authority for them. See Joint
Comm. on Tax'n, Review of Selected Entity Classification and Partnership Tax Issues, JCS-
6-97, Apr. 8, 1997, at 13-16 [hereinafter 1997 JCT Entity Classification Report]; Dougan et
al., supra note 2, at 1143-44.
25. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 998, 1011-15, 1016; Keyser, supra note 6, at 531;
Peel, supra note 6, at 1007-09; Postlewaite et al., supra note 6, at 459-60; Sexton & Osteen,
supra note 6, at 145-46.
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classification regulations was not in their identification of appropriate fac-
tors to consider, but rather in their artificial application of those factors.
As applied, the rules simply failed to separate firms with and without the
identifying characteristics. But an explicit taxpayer election would not be
the way to remedy such a defect.
Another view, however, is that there is no meaningful way to distin-
guish between corporations and partnerships for tax purposes. But even
under this position, there remains the question of why certain business
firms should be entitled to choose the set of rules controlling how their
income is taxed. In general, the tax system does not permit taxpayers to
elect the rules applicable to them. Rather, the system generally attempts
to impose tax rules that follow and are consistent with some economic
characteristic of the taxpayer or the taxpayer's activities. It is unclear
why the check-the-box regulations should deviate from this usual
approach.
If the taxpayer is well-advised, the election, which has ramifications for
tax purposes only, will always be to the detriment of the fisc. One recent
study of a pre-1986 Act year found, not surprisingly, that the "S" elec-
tion-another election of significance for tax purposes only-was driven
largely by tax factors. 26 For example, "S" status was chosen by a higher
proportion of corporations with losses than those with positive taxable
income. In contrast, "C" status tended to be chosen by corporations with
very low levels of positive taxable income, to take advantage of the grad-
uated corporate tax rates. Taxpayers might also try to change elections as
their tax situations change. 27 There is no particular policy reason for the
entity classification decision to always result in the minimization of tax
liabilities for the well-advised.28
Finally, elections are inherently costly and complex for the taxpayer.
The taxpayer must incur the transaction cost of evaluating all tax conse-
quences of the available options before making an informed choice. Fur-
thermore, there is always the possibility of error in making that choice.
In that regard, the twelve-year experience with former Subchapter R of
the Code may be instructive. Subchapter R29 was enacted in 1954 to pro-
vide certain proprietorships and partnerships with an election to be taxed
as corporations. The provision was repealed in 1966 because fewer than
1000 businesses had elected the option and in a number of cases, it had
proved to be a trap for the unwary. Specifically, certain subsequent
changes to the business were found to result in an unexpected liquidation
26. See George A. Plesko, Corporate Taxation and the Financial Characteristics of
Firms, 22 PUB. FIN. Q. 311 (1994).
27. The check-the-box regulations generally require an election to remain in effect for
at least five years unless there is a greater than 50% change in the ownership of the firm.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iv) (1996).
28. See William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax
Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1012-13
(1995).
29. Former I.R.C. § 1361 (1954).
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tax being imposed on the enterprise.
30
B. SHOULD PUBLIC FIRMS BE INELIGIBLE TO MAKE THE EXPLICIT
CLASSIFICATION ELECTION?
Assuming that there is an election, should public firms be entitled to
make it? With certain exceptions, section 7704(a) classifies a publicly
traded partnership as a corporation for tax purposes.31 Thus, public firms
generally must be taxed under Subchapter C and cannot elect to be taxed
under Subchapters K or S. The question is whether such a classification
line is sensible from a policy standpoint.
Section 7704 was enacted in 1987 largely as a stopgap measure in re-
sponse to changes effected by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that made
partnership classification for tax purposes much more attractive than pre-
viously. Just four years earlier, the Treasury had testified that it had
serious doubt that.., one would conclude that the degree of market-
ability of an organization's equity interests should determine the
manner in which the organization is taxed. We are also not con-
vinced that access to a rational system of pass-through taxation
should be restricted on the basis [of whether the organization's own-
ership interests are publicly traded].3 2
Yet in the face of Burger King, the Boston Celtics, and other business
organizations transforming themselves into publicly traded partnerships,
and the consequent spectre of an eroding corporate tax base, the Treas-
ury changed its view and supported enactment of section 7704.
33
Part of the rationale behind section 7704 was that the presence of pub-
lic trading tipped the balance in favor of "corporation" status when one
attempted to weigh the various corporate resemblance factors. As the
Treasury stated in 1986 in explaining its change of view:
As we did in 1983, we recognize now that some publicly traded lim-
ited partnerships will differ in only minor respects from other widely
held, but not publicly traded, limited partnerships. The proposal we
make today is not based on the view that publicly traded limited
30. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1238, at 714-15 (1966).
31. There is an important exception to § 7704(a) for publicly traded partnerships that
have at least 90% of their gross income consisting of passive-type income such as interest
and dividends, or income and gains from real property and mineral or natural resource
exploration or development. See I.R.C. § 7704(c), (d) (1994). Such partnerships, though
publicly traded, may apparently make the check-the-box election.
32. Reform of Corporate Taxation, Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate,
98th Cong. 63 (1983) (statement of Ronald A. Pearlman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy, Dep't of the Treasury) [hereinafter Pearlman Statement].
33. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Report of the Comm. on the
Budget, House of Representatives, H.R. Rep. No. 100-391 pt. 2, 1965-66 (1987); Issues Re-
lating to Passthrough Entities, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 99th Cong. 7, 31 (1986)
(Statement of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Dep't of the Treasury)
[hereinafter Mentz 1986 Statement]; Master Limited Partnerships, Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Tax'n and Debt Management of the Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate, 100th Cong.
44, 74 (1987) (statement of Roger Mentz, Assistant Sectary for Tax Policy, Dep't of the
Treasury) [hereinafter Mentz 1987 statement].
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partnerships are different in kind from all other partnerships, but on
the view that public trading in the interests of a limited partnership is
indicative of the existence of the other, more relevant, classification
factors . . . that may, to a lesser extent, be present in many other
partnerships. 34
But in a world where the "other, more relevant, classification factors"
have been rejected as a basis for distinguishing between corporations and
partnerships for tax purposes, the question is whether the presence of
public trading alone is sufficient to classify a business entity as a corpora-
tion. As the Treasury originally stated in 1983, it is difficult to see why it
should. If one starts with the proposition that the mere free transferabil-
ity of ownership interests does not, by itself, cause partnership status to
be unavailable-and the provisions of Subchapter K certainly contem-
plate some degree of transferability of interests35-then it is hard to un-
derstand why the transfer of such interests in a more efficient manner,
upon creation of some type of market for the interests, should jeopardize
the attainment of that status. 36
One argument is that the liquidity resulting from public trading pro-
vides better access to capital markets and that it is therefore appropriate
to tax that special benefit of organizations with publicly traded inter-
ests. 37 But the corporate tax is not typically thought of as a tax in ex-
change for benefits received, and in any event, there is no indication that
the amount of the tax properly reflects the value of the benefit. More-
over, private firms can also gain access to public capital markets through
financial intermediaries. Thus, it is not logical to penalize (through differ-
ential taxation) firms merely because they can access the markets di-
rectly. Finally, access to capital markets may simply mean access to
capital provided by smaller investors who may be less willing and able to
make illiquid investments. It is not clear why non-publicly traded firms
with access to investors willing to make large capital investments should
be provided with a competitive advantage over publicly traded firms.
Another argument is that public trading is a relatively inelastic feature
of a firm which is not likely to be affected by the existence of an addi-
tional tax burden.38 Thus, imposing an extra tax on firms because their
interests are publicly traded might be in the nature of a nondistortive
lump-sum tax. In fact, however, the tax may not have that effect. The tax
may simply cause capital flows to shift from publicly traded firms to non-
34. Mentz 1986 statement, supra note 33, at 31; see also Sexton & Osteen, supra note
6, at 147-48.
35. See I.R.C. §§ 741-743 (1994).
36. See Keyser, supra note 6, at 532-33. Moreover, under the former classification
regulations, free transferability of interests was considered a corporate characteristic only
if it applied to the transfer of governance rights. Free transferability of economic rights,
alone, did not count as a corporate characteristic. See Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(e)(1); see also Brannan, supra note 6, at 222-23. Yet presumably, the advantage of public
trading relates much more to the transfer of economic rights rather than governance rights.
37. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 365.
38. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Corporate Tax Integration: Liquidity of Investment, 42
TAX NoTEs 1107, 1114 (1989).
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publicly traded ones until a new equilibrium is established. 39 Moreover,
inelasticity assumes a rather radical discontinuity between public and
non-public trading that may not exist, given the many shades of trading
leading up to, but not qualifying as, public trading. Finally, even if it were
true, the inelastic nature of public trading, on its own, does not provide a
normative basis for imposition of the tax.
A final argument concerns the difficulty of applying operating rules
such as those in Subchapter K to an organization with publicly traded
ownership interests. The 1984 ALI Subchapter K report, for example,
recommended that publicly traded entities not qualify for partnership
treatment primarily because of the audit difficulties created.40 The legis-
lative history to section 7704 reveals a similar concern:
[B]ecause of the trading in interests, these partnerships present
unique administrative difficulties and enforcement concerns if the
tax law relating to partnerships is applied to them. The partnership
tax rules under present law contemplate an entity in which the iden-
tity of the investors is known and transfers of interests are easily
identifiable, and public trading in partnership interests does not con-
form to this model.41
Partnership audit rules and computer advances may have mitigated
some of these concerns. To the extent they have not, the question is
whether the public trading aspect of the firm's ownership interests creates
a measurably different and more difficult problem than that encountered
by virtually every business entity beyond the most basic. For example,
the IRS would presumably face many of the same problems in auditing a
multi-member LLC with easily transferable ownership interests. Indeed,
a publicly traded and registered entity may actually be easier to audit
than a large non-publicly traded firm because of the federal and state
reporting requirements imposed on the former and the resulting greater
public scrutiny.42
In summary, if difficulty with the administration and enforcement of
operating rules is the underlying rationale for excluding publicly traded
organizations from making the classification election, then the limitation
may be too narrow. Similarly situated organizations, though without
publicly traded ownership interests, may present the same or greater
problems and should therefore be subject to the identical exclusion. For
39. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1011; Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Lim-
ited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 472-73 (1992).
40. Federal Income Tax Project, Subchapter K, Proposals on the Taxation of Partners
383 (Am. Law Inst. 1984) [hereinafter ALl 1984 Subchapter K Proposals].
41. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Report of the Comm. on the Budget
H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, 1067 (1987); see also Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability
Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47
TAX L. REV. 815, 825 (1992).
42. See Pearlman Statement, supra note 32, at 64. See also Issues Relating to Passth-
rough Entities, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm.
on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 99th Cong. 40, 42 (1986) (statement of Wil-
liam S. McKee) (publicly-traded partnerships are "probably the cleanest tax report entities
that we have").
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the same reason, publicly traded firms with income and gain mostly from
real estate, mineral, and oil and gas activities should lose their exception
from section 7704 and should be barred from making the election.43
More importantly, however, permitting the legitimate concern with rule
administration and enforcement to dictate the level of tax liability would
seem to put matters exactly backwards. As one commentator has said,
administrative rules should carry out substantive provisions, including the
policy determination of how much tax should be paid, and not vice-
versa.
44
C. SHOULD STATE LAW CORPORATIONS BE INELIGIBLE TO MAKE
THE CLASSIFICATION ELECTION?
Prohibiting state law corporations from making the election would
seem to throw the classification issue back into the hands of state legisla-
tors. For example, states might respond to the prohibition by enacting
business organization statutes mirroring existing corporation statutes, ex-
cept that the business would be required to file "articles of organization"
instead of "articles of incorporation" so that it would not technically be a
state law corporation. The new business form might be called an "un-
corporation," but with all the same rights and responsibilities as existing
corporations. 45 Obviously, such mirror statutes would be vulnerable
under a "substance over form" challenge, yet it is exactly that type of
challenge that the IRS has relinquished by adopting the check-the-box
regulations. 46 If the state law characteristics of an entity no longer matter
in determining how the entity should be taxed, then firms organized
under "uncorporation" statutes should be entitled to make the check-the-
box election.
It would be neither wise nor efficient to force states to enact such stat-
utes one by one, or gradually to amend their LLC or other statutes to
provide businesses with more and more "corporate" rights and responsi-
bilities. 47 Rather, under an elective classification approach, it would be
43. See I.R.C. § 7704(c), (d) (1994).
44. See Donna D. Adler, Master Limited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 755, 784
(1988).
45. See Robert R. Keatinge, Corporations, Unincorporated Organizations, and
Unincorporations: Check-the-Box and the Balkanization of Business Organizations, 1 J.
SMALL & EMERG. Bus. LAW, 201, 241 (1997).
46. To challenge the eligibility of "uncorporations" to make the election, the IRS
would have to assert that firms organized under such a statute so closely resemble a corpo-
ration that they should be treated like one. Yet it is exactly such a test-a "corporate
resemblance" standard-that was previously in place and that the check-the-box regula-
tions have specifically overturned. It therefore would be nonsensical for the IRS to try to
resurrect the argument so soon after its repudiation.
47. This process has already begun. For example, during its 1997 session, the Virginia
General Assembly deleted the provision in Virginia's LLC statute requiring that the arti-
cles of organization of such an entity state the latest date on which the entity must be
dissolved and its affairs wound up. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1011 (Michie Supp. 1997)
(resulting in a rule that permits LLCs to have perpetual duration just like corporations);
see also Payson R. Peabody, Check-the-Box Treasury Regs. Encourage States to Authorize
Single-Member LLCs, 7 J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 79 (1997) (describing other amendments to
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much more sensible to permit state law corporations to "check the box"
as well.48 Such a step would at least preserve the established jurispru-
dence of corporate law rather than encouraging the case-by-case deveiop-
ment of "uncorporation" law. It would also clearly establish "public
trading" as the only remaining classification factor for general business
firms. Assuming that public firms are not allowed to check the box, they
would be taxed under the rules of Subchapter C and all other firms (in-
cluding private corporations) would be entitled to elect the tax regime
under which they will be taxed.
D. WHY SHOULD PRIVATE BUSINESS FIRMS BE ENTITLED TO
CHOOSE AMONG SUBCHAPTERS C, S AND K As THEIR
APPLICABLE METHOD OF TAXATION?
There remains the further question of why private business firms
should be able to choose among Subchapters C, S and K for their applica-
ble tax rules. In other words, assuming such firms are entitled to "check
the box," why are there so many boxes to check, and why should there be
these particular boxes? The three sets of tax rules were each designed
with a particular business organization form in mind-Subchapters C and
S for corporations and Subchapter K for a general partnership-yet the
clear message of the check-the-box regulations is that business organiza-
tion form and characteristics generally do not matter for tax purposes.
If the three sets of rules produced more or less the same tax conse-
quences in most situations, the choice among them would not be espe-
cially significant. But that is not the case. In any given situation,
Subchapters C, S or K might provide an advantageous tax result for par-
ticular taxpayers. For example, Subchapter C generally offers graduated
tax rates for the business income of firms subject to those rules,49 and
there are a host of special tax provisions limited to Subchapter C firms.50
Subchapter K offers the purest form of conduit taxation under which the
entity is not taxed and business income and losses are passed through to
state LLC statutes to make them closer to corporations); cf William H. Clark, Jr., What the
Business World Is Looking for in an Organizational Form: The Pennsylvania Experience,
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 178 (1997) (predicting that as a result of check-the-box,
noncorporate forms will increasingly acquire corporate characteristics); Larry E. Ribstein,
Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 369, 432 (1995) (predicting possible development of "corporate-type partnerships" if
IRS classification proposal is adopted).
48. The REMIC and FASIT legislation disregards the organizational form of the busi-
ness entity and permits state law corporations, partnerships, and trusts all to elect the spe-
cial pass-through tax treatment authorized by the legislation. See I.R.C. §§ 860D(a),
860L(a)(1) (1994); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Conf Report to Accompany H.R. 3838, H.
CONF. REP. No. 99-841, vol. II, at 226 (1986) (any entity, including a corporation, partner-
ship, or trust, meeting certain requirements may elect to be treated as a REMIC).
49. See I.R.C. § 11(b). If the shareholder tax of a Subchapter C firm is deferred or
reduced sufficiently or eliminated altogether, the graduated rate structure can mean that
business income is taxed more favorably under Subchapter C than under either Subchap-
ters S or K.
50. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 465(a)(1)(B), 469(a)(2)(B) (1994) (at risk and passive activity
loss rules generally applicable only to certain closely held C corporations).
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the owners of the firm. Subchapter S offers another form of conduit taxa-
tion that is in many cases less advantageous than Subchapter K, but in
certain cases, more advantageous. 51
In short, even assuming that there is a good policy basis for taxing pri-
vate firms differently from public ones, there does not seem to be any
particular theory to support the current outcome under check-the-box,
where private firms are entitled to select among Subchapters C, S, and K
for their applicable tax regime. By providing such disparate choices with-
out any apparent underlying conceptual foundation, the law has simply
provided a tax benefit for the well-advised and a trap for the ill-advised.
But if the existing choices are irrational, how should the law be changed?
How should private firms be taxed? These issues are addressed in the
next part.
E. How SHOULD THE INCOME OF PRIVATE BUSINESS FIRMS
BE TAXED?
With the loss of the "anchor" of state law characteristics to guide how a
business should be taxed, there would seem to be only two choices avail-
able to policymakers. One option is to adopt "conduit" taxation of all
private business firms, no matter how organized, and to disregard the
firm as a taxpayer separate and apart from its owners. Rather, the firm
would be transparent for tax purposes; its various tax characteristics
would pass through to the owners of the firm, the real (and only) taxpay-
ers in interest. Under current law, the purest form of conduit taxation is
found in the partnership tax rules of Subchapter K.
The other choice is to adopt "entity" taxation of private business firms,
and to treat the firm as a taxable entity in its own right. Although entity
taxation is often associated with "double taxation," it need not have that
consequence. For example, in 1992, the Treasury Department recom-
mended exploration of an approach, termed the Comprehensive Business
Income Tax (CBIT), which would subject the income of all business enti-
51. For example, § 752 generally permits the owners of a Subchapter K firm to include
their share of entity-level debt in their basis in the ownership interests of the firm whereas
there is no comparable rule for Subchapter S firms. Also, contributions and distributions
of property between an owner and the firm are more likely to be tax-free under Sub-
chapter K than Subchapter S. Compare I.R.C. §§ 721, 731 (1994) with I.R.C. §§ 351, 311,
336, 331, 1368 (1994). Furthermore, Subchapter K but not Subchapter S firms may spe-
cially allocate their tax items among their owners. Compare I.R.C. § 704(a), (b) (1994)
with I.R.C. § 1377(a) (1994). Finally, only Subchapter K contains an elective procedure for
adjusting the inside basis of the firm's assets to be consistent with the outside basis of the
owners in their ownership interests in the firm. See I.R.C. § 754 (1994). This last provision
is particularly advantageous to taxpayers where there is a death of an owner and the inside
basis of the firm's assets can be changed to take into account the resulting § 1014 adjust-
ment to the basis in the ownership interests.
On the other hand, there exists in subchapter K but not subchapter S a variety of compli-
cated rules designed to prevent tax advantages in selected situations. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§§ 704(c), 707(a)(2), 707(b), 724, 731(c), 735, 737, 751 (1994). In addition, conversion of a
firm from C to S corporation status is tax-free (not so for C to K conversions), and S
corporations, but not Subchapter K firms, can participate in a tax-free reorganization.
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ties (except for extremely small ones in terms of gross receipts), including
sole proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, and firms organized in
other business forms, to a single, comprehensive entity-level tax, with
generally no further income tax consequences at the owner level.52 Other
similar proposals have been made over the years.53 The Treasury esti-
mated that CBIT would produce greater welfare gains than any other
form of corporate integration, including the Treasury's version of partner-
ship-style integration.54
The next sections briefly explore some of the pros and cons of conduit
and entity taxation.
1. The Basic Case for Conduit Taxation
The most basic form of business is the sole proprietorship. Sole propri-
etors have historically been taxed directly on their proprietorship income
as it arises and been entitled to deduct currently any losses of the enter-
prise as they arise. The business itself has not been subject to a separate
federal income tax. It would theoretically be possible to treat a proprie-
torship as a taxpayer separate from its proprietor, but such a system
would be very problematic, depending upon the applicable tax rate struc-
ture. For example, if all proprietorships were treated as taxpayers subject
to a flat thirty percent income tax rate, then tax payers in marginal tax
brackets higher than thirty percent might be encouraged to redesign their
economic arrangements to generate proprietorship income for them-
selves rather than wages or other income. 55 Meanwhile, proprietors in
marginal tax brackets less than thirty percent might be encouraged to
employ the opposite strategy. For instance, they might increase the level
of deductible salary payments paid by their proprietorship to themselves.
Given the absence of arm's length dealing in a proprietorship, it would
presumably be extremely difficult for the IRS to monitor and prevent
purely tax-motivated recharacterizations of this sort.
Assuming proprietors are to continue to be taxed directly on their busi-
ness income and losses, it follows that businesses with more than one
owner should likewise be taxed as conduits. If the proprietorship is not
treated as a separate taxpayer, it is difficult to see why, for example, a
two-person general partnership should be so treated. Further analogies
then might suggest that no business firm should be separately taxed. As
an economic matter, if proprietors are taxed directly on their proprietor-
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPO-
RATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY IN-
TEGRATION REPORT].
53. See Mortimer M. Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organiza-
tion: Is It Time for a "Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REV. 249, 261 (1961) (suggesting
adoption of an entity-level tax on the profits of virtually all business enterprises, whether
incorporated or not, combined with a lowering of dividend taxes to alleviate concerns of
double taxation).
54. See TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 52, at 134 (table 13.8), 139.
55. This discussion ignores the potentially significant effect of employment and state
and local taxes on the choice of compensation arrangement.
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ship income, but partnerships (and not the partners) are taxed on the
partnership income, then the tax system will have created an undesirable
barrier against, or inducement in favor of, the pooling of resources via a
partnership.
True, the state law characteristics of a proprietorship may be different
from those of many other business forms. Unlike a proprietorship, other
forms of business organization are treated for an increasing number of
state law purposes as legal entities separate from their owners. For exam-
ple, under the recently Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), 56 the
withdrawal of a partner from a partnership causes the dissolution of the
partnership only in limited circumstances. 57 RUPA also makes clearer
that a partner is not co-owner of the underlying property of the partner-
ship; rather, the only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership
is the right to share in profits and losses and to receive distributions. 58
Other forms of doing business, such as limited partnerships, LLCs, lim-
ited liability partnerships (LLPs), limited liability limited partnerships
(LLLPs), and of course, corporations, justify an entity interpretation of
the business because, among other things, they generally insulate the
owners from the entity's liabilities. Further, for reasons previously men-
tioned, the check-the-box regulations may accelerate these state law
trends, with future approval by the states of non-corporate business forms
having more and more entity characteristics.
But perhaps such state law differences among business entities should
be largely ignored in deciding upon the method of taxing such entities. 59
Given the ineffectiveness of the corporate resemblance classification test,
the nature of the check-the-box substitute, the recent history of state law
experimentation regarding forms of business organizations, and the likeli-
hood that such experimentation will continue, perhaps state law charac-
teristics should generally not be a factor in determining how the income
of an entity should be taxed. Rather, we should consider the relevant tax
policy considerations.
The strongest tax policy argument in favor of the conduit approach is
that people pay taxes, not entities, and that people should pay income
56. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1995) [hereinafter RUPA].
57. See id. § 801. See generally id. § 201 ("[a] partnership is an entity distinct from its
partners"), id. § 201 ("RUPA embraces the entity theory of the partnership"). As of the
end of 1995, seven states had adopted the RUPA. Although the Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA) included certain entity-type characteristics for partnerships, particularly relating to
the rights of the entity to own and convey property, the Act generally favored an aggregate
interpretation of the partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 8, 10, 25, 26, 6
U.L.A. 125 (1995) [hereinafter UPA]. Examples of the UPA's aggregate approach in-
cluded its provisions relating to the joint and several liability of partners for partnership
debts, the rights of all partners to manage and conduct the business of the partnership, and
the dissolution of a partnership upon any partner's ceasing to be associated with the busi-
ness. See id. §§ 15, 18(e), 29.
58. See RUPA, §§ 501, 502.
59. Cf William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13, 15
(1972) (arguing that correlation between taxation method and relationship under state law
of an entity to its owner has "relatively limited explanatory value").
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taxes in accordance with their ability to pay. The use of an entity to gen-
erate income should not interfere with that basic objective. Hence, the
entity should be disregarded for tax purposes and the income of the en-
tity should be taxed directly to its owners. Entity losses should similarly
be passed through and netted against any income of the owners. A fur-
ther argument, as mentioned initially, is that adoption of a tax system
other than a conduit approach would seem to distort the choice of busi-
ness form, given how proprietorships are taxed.
But these arguments may only be applicable to a theoretically ideal
form of conduit taxation. For reasons detailed in the next section, if a
conduit approach is considered in actual practice, it may be that such an
approach does not accomplish either policy objective very well while, at
the same time, spawning significant transactions costs.
2. The Fundamental Difficulty of Conduit Taxation and the Case for
Entity Taxation
The theoretical reasons favoring conduit taxation would lead one to
conclude that entity taxation is unacceptable. For example, if we take as
a given that people and not entities pay taxes, and that people should pay
income taxes in accordance with their ability to pay, then it would seem
odd and inconsistent with those premises to impose a separate income tax
on the business entity itself. Despite the nominal incidence of the tax on
the business, some people will still pay it; we just will not know who.
Similarly, it would seem impossible to determine the proper rate for an
entity tax. For instance, if the owners of the firm indirectly bear the bur-
den of the entity-level income tax, then the proper rate for the tax should
presumably be tied to their ability to pay. But how should the entity tax
rate be determined when the ability to pay of the owners is different from
one another?
But the case for entity taxation is essentially a negative one. Specifi-
cally, if it is not possible to design a workable conduit tax system that is
broadly applicable to most private business firms and consistent with gen-
eral income tax principles, then an entity tax approach may be worth a
second look. To illustrate some of the difficulties with conduit taxation,
the balance of the discussion will focus mainly on the partnership tax
rules-Subchapter K-because they represent the most refined example
of conduit taxation in existence.
Under conduit taxation, if a business firm earns $300 in taxable profits
in a given year, a total of $300 of taxable income must be currently in-
cluded in the tax base of the owners of the firm. But how much should be
included in whose base? The difficulty in answering that question is the
fundamental problem of any conduit system.
The source of the difficulty is the fact that income and other items real-
ized by many business entities are treated under state law as belonging to
the entity and not to the owners. The receipt by the owners of the en-
tity's income, for example, may arise only upon a distribution from the
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entity. Yet consistent with basic income tax principles, tax reporting of
the income cannot await a distribution. Someone must include it in that
person's tax base when the income arises. Thus, if there is no distribution
and the income is retained by the entity, there must nevertheless be a
current allocation of the income among the owners to permit them to
report currently their share of it.
How is the allocation of income and other items determined for tax
purposes under current law? Subject to several conditions to be de-
scribed in part III of this Article, current law permits the allocation of tax
items to be made with great flexibility. Indeed, the general rule for a
partnership allows the determination to be made by the partners in their
partnership agreement. 60 Hence, the partners might agree to allocate the
income equally among themselves, or to allocate all of the income to only
one partner, or to provide for any other sharing arrangement. The only
limitation is that all of the partnership's taxable income must be reported
by some partner or partners for the year. The partners also may allocate
to themselves different shares of each partnership tax item in any given
year, and may vary the allocation of each such item from year to year.
Why are the tax rules so liberal in permitting partners to divide up the
tax consequences of their partnership's activities? The principal reason is
to accommodate the economic flexibility desired by the partners. In a
typical law partnership, for example, the partners might share the eco-
nomic benefits and burdens of the firm arising during the year based on a
host of factors, including the number of hours billed, the amount of new
business obtained, the profitability of the branch of the firm in which
most services were performed, the time spent on firm management re-
sponsibilities, and so forth. Similarly, in a real estate partnership, the
partners might look to the relative contributions by the partners of capital
and services, the nature and timing of the services provided, the compara-
tive risk aversion or desire for reward of the partners with respect to cer-
tain of the properties of the firm, and other factors. There are
presumably welfare gains in permitting the partners the flexibility to ar-
range their economic affairs in this manner. Thus, the tax sharing rules
are flexible to permit consistency with flexible economic sharing arrange-
ments. Indeed, the tax shares can even be determined with hindsight,
that is, after the end of the year in question, again to accommodate the
often hindsight determinations of economic shares.
But flexible tax sharing rules also may be used simply to minimize the
collective tax liabilities of the partners, to the detriment of the Treasury
and all other taxpayers. By allocating items to the partner who is in a
position to utilize them most favorably for tax purposes, the partners can
put their respective tax advantages to best use and share in the resulting
tax savings. As Professor Surrey and others stated with some concern
when special allocations were first permitted in 1954:
60. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (1994).
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parties, perhaps for the first time in the history of the tax laws, will
be permitted to agree on the incidence of tax; to agree as to which of
several co-earners of income shall be entitled to specific items of in-
come and of income tax deduction and credits. Capital gains could
be allocated on one basis, dividends on another, tax-free interest in
accordance with still another ratio. By agreement, operating ex-
penses, depletion or depreciation could all be allocated in differing
proportions.
The ability to contract with respect to specific items of income, and
particularly with respect to specific items of deduction and credit,
would give the ingenious businessman and his lawyers the utmost
flexibility in devising a variety of novel and unique business
arrangements. 61
Is there anything wrong with the partners minimizing their collective
tax liabilities in that manner? The objection, often unstated, is the con-
cern that the partnership vehicle permits the taxpayer to obtain a more
favorable tax result than the one that would arise had the taxpayer simply
owned a share of the business's assets directly. 62 Thus, assume a taxpayer
would have had $100 of taxable income from a share of certain real estate
assets had the taxpayer owned that share.directly. Assume that with $100
of income for the year from the asset, a portion of the taxpayer's net
operating loss carryover would have expired unused. To preserve the in-
tegrity of the taxable unit, the tax laws presumably should not permit the
taxpayer to join up with two others, obtain a special $300 allocation of
taxable income for the year (representing the taxpayer's share of income
from the asset and the share of the taxpayer's partners), offset it with a
disproportionately small allocation of income in future years, and thereby
make greater use of the carryover than would otherwise have been possi-
ble. A tax system allowing that result neither protects vertical equity
objectives nor is neutral in the choice of business form, the two strengths
initially identified for the conduit approach.
Can such tax advantages be prevented? The basic technique, and the
one attempted in the partnership tax area, is to link the allocation made
for tax purposes to the economic allocation of the parties. Thus, for ex-
ample, if the $300 in income from the real estate asset were all distributed
to the taxpayer because of some priority interest the taxpayer had in the
asset generating the income, then it might be appropriate to allocate the
$300 of taxable income all to that taxpayer. Again, it is worth comparing
the partnership investment to a direct ownership in the assets. Had the
partners owned the assets directly and only one of the partners received
all of the income, it might be perfectly consistent with income tax princi-
61. J. Paul Jackson, et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1187-88 (1954).
62. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1995) (potential applicability of
partnership anti-abuse regulation if "[t]he present value of the partners' aggregate federal
tax liability is substantially less than had the partners owned the partnership's assets and
conducted the partnership's activities directly").
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ples to tax that same partner, and none of the others, on all of the
income.
The problem, however, is that so long as there is state law separation
between the entity and the owners-that is, the owners do not, in fact,
own the assets directly but instead only own interests in the firm which
owns the asset-the economic baseline against which the tax allocation
needs to be compared is necessarily missing. We simply do not know how
the partners would have shared the $300 if it is retained rather than dis-
tributed by the firm. Indeed, in many cases, the partners themselves do
not even know how they would have shared the money because their
"deal" may extend far beyond the economic results of the first year. But
without that piece of information, it is not possible to fashion a workable
rule that can ferret out purely tax-advantaged allocation arrangements
under a conduit method of taxation. 63
In summary, the central flaw of conduit taxation is its inability to pro-
vide assurance that the proper amount of business income and loss for
any given year is allocated and taxed to the proper owner. Under the
conduit method, allocations of entity tax items may have no grounding in
economic substance due to the absence of an economic baseline against
which the allocation can be tested. In addition, the validity of allocations
cannot even be tied to matters of legal form because it is the entity, and
not the owners, that maintains legal ownership of the items in question.
As a result, the conduit approach is unable to protect vertical equity
norms; that objective may be thwarted, for example, by allocating to a
high-bracket owner a disproportionately small share of the entity's in-
come for a given year. Further, the choice of business form is distorted
by the existence of tax advantages available only to businesses with more
than one owner, which are taxed as conduits. Although the law has cer-
tainly evolved well beyond its state in 1954, Professor Surrey's concerns
at that time with the potential flexibility of special allocations still seem to
be appropriate. 64
3. Administrability Concerns
The discussion thus far would seem to have exposed major flaws in
both conduit and entity taxation. Although the latter would tax the busi-
ness income at the wrong rate, the former cannot provide assurance that
the proper amount of business income is to be taxed to the right taxpayer.
So which approach is preferable?
There is no easy answer to that question. Concerns about the ease with
which the IRS can administer the rules and taxpayers can comply with
them, however, should obviously play a role in deciding the preferred
approach. Otherwise, any rules developed risk being a mere facade, a
63. See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 TAX L.
REV. 1, 10-11 (1990); cf ALAN GUNN, PARTNERSHIP INCOME TAXATION 53-54 (2d ed.
1995).
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 51
1997] TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 143
nice theoretical way of imposing taxes on business income that is not
matched by real world consequences to most taxpayers. Administrability
concerns are particularly significant given the liberal access to the rules
provided by the check-the-box regulations to taxpayers with widely dif-
fering levels of sophistication and tolerances for complexity. Based on
this factor, the conduit system epitomized by Subchapter K begins with a
couple of very black marks.
For one thing, Subchapter K is notoriously difficult to comprehend and
apply. Many analysts have suggested that there may be widespread disre-
gard of one or more of the existing rules because of the inability of firms
and their advisors to apply them correctly and of the IRS to administer
them. Indeed, back in 1986-which is practically the Dark Ages from the
standpoint of the development and resulting complexity in Subchapter
K-one tax expert estimated a mere two and one-half percent compli-
ance rate with one particular partnership provision.65 More recently, an-
other distinguished tax expert, a former Chief Counsel of the IRS and
Chair of the ABA Section of Taxation, has conceded the need to enlist
expert assistance to give advice on core portions of the partnership tax
law. 66 In addition, the General Accounting Office has reported on the
ineffectual nature of the IRS's strategy for ensuring compliance among
partnerships and their partners.67
Second, the partnership tax rules were recently made even more diffi-
cult by the adoption of a general "anti-abuse" regulation in Subchapter
K. The regulation expressly grants the Commissioner authority to recast
a partnership transaction if a principal purpose of the transaction is to
reduce substantially the present value of the partners' aggregate federal
income tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent with the intent of
65. See Issues Relating to Passthrough Entities: Hearings on H.R. 1658, 2571, 3397,
4448 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong. 56 (1986) (statement of Joel Rabinovitz) (section 751(b) is probably
overlooked in 90% of the cases in which it applies, is ignored in another 5% of the cases
because the cost of compliance would be so high, and is misapplied by the IRS in another
2-1/2% of the cases). See Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse Rules, 48
TAX LAw. 827, 829 n.17 (1995). Banoff describes how most taxpayers and their advisors
employ a "common sense" approach to the tax law (i.e., it is cheaper to guess
the right answer than to research it thoroughly; it is easier to take an aggres-
sive reporting position than it is to plan prophylactically; it is simpler to make
a "reasonable" estimate than to compile detailed records of substantiation).
Id. See also Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 65, 107-08(1991) (Subchapter K "has become one of the most inaccessible and burdensome features
of the entire tax system"); Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Com-
panies, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 13, 57 (1995); GUNN, supra note 63, at 44; Pamela Olson,
Some Thoughts on Anti-Abuse Rules, 48 TAX LAw. 817, 824 (1995); Joseph A. Snoe, Eco-
nomic Reality or Regulatory Game Playing?: The Too Many Fictions of the § 752 Liability
Allocation Regulations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1887, 1888-90 (1994).
66. See N. Jerold Cohen, It Always Looks Better When You Look Back, 46 TAX LAW.
683, 684 (1993).
67. See U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, IRS' Partnership Compliance Activities Could Be Im-
proved, GAO/GGD-95-151 (1995), reprinted in 95 T.N.T. 118-21 (June 19, 1995). The IRS
is attempting to increase its audit coverage of partnership returns. See INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE, Examination Program Letter-FY 1997 (Nov. 1996), at 7; Phil Brand, IRS
Releases 1997 Examination Program Letter, 28 TAX ADVISER 242, 242 (1997).
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Subchapter K.68 The recharacterization may take place "even though the
transaction may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory or
regulatory provision. ' 69 In addition, regarding the intersection between
the partnership provisions and other aspects of the Internal Revenue
Code, the regulation authorizes the Commissioner to treat a partnership
as "an aggregate of its partners" if appropriate to carry out the purpose of
such other parts of the Code.70 "Aggregate" treatment apparently means
that the partners are deemed to own directly the assets, and participate
directly in the activities, of the partnership. 71
Although there continues to be some disagreement as to the meaning
and scope of the regulation, as well as its wisdom and validity, 72 the adop-
tion of the regulation is certainly not a positive sign regarding the general
health of the Subchapter K rules. Indeed, some of the commentary pub-
lished in response to the proposed version of the regulation illustrates
examples of transactions meeting the literal terms of the statute or regu-
lations yet reaching seemingly nonsensical results.73 The approach of the
final regulation is to modify the result of dysfunctional cases only where
that result was the motivating factor for the parties to the transaction.74
Yet, it is unclear why tax results should turn on one's state of mind, even
if that state could be accurately ascertained. 75 Put another way, the dys-
68. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (as amended in 1995).
69. Id.
70. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(1) (as amended in 1992). This part of the regulation
was in response to cases such as Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 616 (1994),
withdrawn and rev'd, 104 T.C. 105 (1995), rev'd, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 1996). See David J.
Shakow, How Now Brown K?, 63 TAX NOTES 1761 (1994).
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(f) ex. (1), (2) and (3).
72. Some recent commentary on the final version of the anti-abuse regulation includes
Sheldon I. Banoff, Anatomy of an Antiabuse Rule: What's Really Wrong with Reg. Section
1.701-2, 66 TAX NOTES 1859 (1995); Sheldon I. Banoff, The Use and Misuse of Anti-Abuse
Rules, 48 TAX LAW. 827 (1995); Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Appropriateness of Anti-Abuse
Rules in the U.S. Income Tax System, 48 TAX LAW. 801 (1995); Michael J. Grace, Final
Anti-Abuse Regulation Expanded and Clarified, but Uncertainties Remain, 12 J. PARTNER-
SHIP TAX'N 91 (1995); Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW.
807 (1995); Richard M. Lipton, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulations Revisited: Is There
Calm After the Storm?, 83 J. TAX'N 68 (1995); and Olson. See also Jackson et al., supra
note 61, at 1184-94.
73. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on the Proposed Partner-
ship Antiabuse Rule, 64 TAX NOTES 233 (1994). The recent case of ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. 2189 (1997) illustrates another large transaction that seemed to
satisfy the literal provisions of the statute and regulations but reached an impermissible
result. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. 7. For recent commentary on the ACM case, see
Steven M. Surdell, ACM Partnership-A New Test for Corporate Tax Shelters?, 75 TAX
NOTES 1377 (1997). For additional discussion of some of the current problems of Sub-
chapter K, see 1997 JCT Entity Classification Report, supra note 24, at 26-56; William D.
Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership Distributions,
47 TAX L. REV. 3 (1991); William B. Brannan, The Subchapter K Reform Act of 1997, 75
TAX NOTES 121 (1997).
74. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), (8), (9), (10), (11).
75. See ALI 1984 Subchapter K Proposals, supra note 40, at 245 (arguing against sub-
jective intent test in determining validity of tax allocation); Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent
and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 485, 515 (1967) ("If tax-
reducing actions are to pass muster but tax avoidance actions are to be penalized, some
way of distinguishing between the two must be located. The trouble is that, as a mental
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functional rule would seem to be the source of the problem, not the tax-
payer's state of mind.
Finally, whatever one might think of the merits of the anti-abuse regu-
lation, it is evident that if one were writing on a clean slate, one would not
adopt a set of operating rules like Subchapter K that first touts their flexi-
bility,76 then proceeds to restrict that flexibility with a series of highly
complex mechanical and sometimes subjective tests,77 and then overlays
on top of those tests a relatively amorphous supertest authorizing the dis-
regard of the consequences of earlier tests despite plain compliance with
them. Indeed, the general anti-abuse rule may apparently apply to ne-
gate a taxpayer's successful navigation of other anti-abuse rules adopted
to monitor particular types of partnership-related transactions. 78 Some-
thing very fundamental must be awry in the basic structure of the rules
for the law to have evolved into this unhappy state.
4. Summary
The key question facing policymakers in a post-check-the-box world is
how private business firms should be taxed. Until now, the tax rules have
been tied at least in part to the state law organizational form and charac-
teristics of the firm. But with removal of that important anchor by the
check-the-box regulations, more creative solutions are needed.
The two basic choices are to tax all private business firms, regardless of
organizational structure, as a conduit or as a separate entity. Each option
contains a fundamental flaw. Entity taxation can result in the taxation of
business income at the wrong rate. Conduit taxation, however, can per-
mit a misallocation of the tax base among the taxpayers involved. There-
fore, no obvious answer exists regarding which option is preferable. The
choice should perhaps be resolved based upon administrability concerns:
which tax system would be the simplest from the standpoint of taxpayer
compliance and IRS review? Part III considers that question in the con-
text of one important issue.
phenomenon, a desire to minimize taxes does not differ from a desire to avoid taxes");
Edwin S. Cohen, Taxing the State of Mind, 12 TAX EXECUTIVE 200, 218 (1960) ("[t]o [make
tax consequences] depend upon selecting and weighing the motives or state of mind which
prompted his action is a far more complex assignment, and one which I believe we should
endeavor to avoid.").
76. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong. 65 (1954).
77. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (as amended in 1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (as
amended in 1992); Treas Reg. § 1.704-3 (as amended in 1995); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
3T (1993).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d), ex. (8)(iii) (general anti-abuse rule may recast trans-
action already subject to (and presumably satisfying the requirements of) anti-abuse dis-
guised sale rule in section 707).
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III. THE PROPER ALLOCATION OF NONRECOURSE
DEDUCTIONS IN A POST-CHECK-THE-BOX WORLD
A. INTRODUCTION
This part concerns one issue illustrating the conceptual and administra-
tive difficulties of implementing a conduit tax system for private business
enterprises in a post-check-the-box world. The issue is the proper tax
treatment of liabilities incurred by a business firm providing limited lia-
bility protection to all of its owners. Under entity taxation, such liabilities
would be treated by the entity for tax purposes under normal income tax
principles. For example, liabilities incurred in acquiring an asset would
ordinarily be included in the entity's basis in that asset. 79 If the asset is
depreciable, the depreciation deductions of the entity would be a function
of the entity's liability-included basis in the asset.80 Finally, if the debt is
nonrecourse, then upon disposition of the property secured by the liabil-
ity, the amount realized by the firm in the disposition would ordinarily
include the full amount of the liability still outstanding81
Conduit taxation relies on the same principles but introduces one addi-
tional issue. Because the owners of the firm, and not the entity itself, are
the taxpayers under a conduit system, some method needs to be devel-
oped to determine the share of each owner in the liabilities of the firm
and the tax items (such as depreciation deductions) arising from those
liabilities. This task is made more difficult if, under state law, the owners
of the firm are insulated from liability for the entity's debts. In that case,
the owners must be allocated for tax purposes shares of the entity's liabil-
ities for which they bear no economic risk.
To illustrate, consider a partnership that is capitalized with $3,000 from
its partners. The partnership borrows an additional $7,000 to purchase a
$10,000 piece of depreciable equipment to be used in the partnership's
business. Assume that the equipment can be written off for tax purposes
over ten years in a straight-line manner. If the partnership were taxed as
a separate entity, then it would be entitled to a $1,000 depreciation de-
duction ($10,000 total basis + 10) in its first year. If, however, the part-
nership is taxed as a conduit, then the $1,000 deduction must be allocated
among the partners, to be claimed on their own tax returns. In addition,
because the partners collectively have only invested $3,000 in the partner-
ship, their basis in their partnership interests must in some way be in-
creased by the $7,000 liability in order to replicate the $10,000 basis they
would have had if they had made the same investment directly. And the
same allocations must be made even if the firm is organized as an LLC
79. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
80. See I.R.C. §§ 167(c), 1016(a) (1994).
81. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-2(a)(1),
1.1001-2(a)(u)(i) (1980). If property subject to a recourse liability is disposed of, the liabil-
ity is included in the amount realized only if another person agrees to pay the liability. See
id. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(ii).
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and the owners therefore never have any personal obligation to repay the
firm's $7,000 debt.
The following sections summarize the current law rules, explain why
the rules are inadequate, and offer some ideas for possible improvement.
B. CURRENT LAW
As previously mentioned, current law permits partners to determine
their respective shares of the tax items of their partnership by private
agreement. They may determine different shares for each tax item and
may change the shares from year to year. They may also make the deter-
mination with the benefit of hindsight, that is, after the tax items of the
partnership have been completely ascertained. To be sustained by the
IRS, however, an allocation must have "substantial economic effect." If
it does not, or if the partners do not agree upon an allocation, a partner's
share of tax items is determined in accordance with the partner's interest
in the partnership (PIP).82
To have substantial economic effect, an allocation must satisfy both the
"economic effect" and "substantiality" tests.83 The purpose of the "eco-
nomic effect" test is to ensure that any allocation for tax purposes is con-
sistent with the economic allocation of the partners. In other words, if
there is an economic burden or benefit corresponding to a particular tax
item, the partner to whom the tax item is allocated must receive the eco-
nomic benefit or bear the economic burden. 84 In general, the regulations
implement the "economic effect" test by requiring that the capital ac-
counts of the partners-the accounts that keep track of the economic ar-
rangement of the partners between and among themselves-be
maintained in a certain way, be adjusted in the same manner as the allo-
cation of tax items, and be respected by the partners in determining their
economic interests in the partnership. 85 By maintaining, adjusting, and
respecting capital accounts in the manner indicated, the hope is that tax
allocations are matched by corresponding economic consequences.
"Economic effect" focuses, however, only on the pre-tax consequences
of an allocation: whether the dollar amount of burden or benefit allo-
cated for tax purposes is matched by a like amount allocated for eco-
nomic purposes. Although dollars of income or loss may be all the same
for economic purposes, they are not all the same for tax purposes.
Whether a dollar of income is capital gain, interest income from a tax-
exempt bond, or proceeds from the sale of a section 1231 asset, makes a
difference for tax purposes. Thus, if "economic effect" were the only test,
it would be a simple matter for partners to allocate consistent amounts of
partnership items for tax and economic purposes, while at the same time
allocating matters such as the character of the itom in a tax-favorable way.
82. See I.R.C. § 704(a)-(b) (1994).
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1994).
84. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a).
85. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b).
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For example, two 50/50 partners might each be allocated $100 of income
for tax and economic purposes, except that one partner (with otherwise
unusable and expiring capital loss carryforwards) might be allocated all
capital gain income, and the other all tax-exempt income.
To address these concerns, the regulations include the "substantiality"
test to make sure the pre-tax economic consequences of the allocation are
substantial in comparison with its tax consequences.86 Thus, substantial-
ity is met if there is a reasonable possibility that the allocation will affect
substantially the dollar amounts to be received by the partners, independ-
ent of tax consequences. 87 Conversely, allocations are considered "shift-
ing" or "transitory," and therefore not substantial and invalid, if there is a
strong likelihood that they will not affect substantially the partners' capi-
tal account balances yet will reduce the collective tax liabilities of the
partners after taking into account their individual tax characteristics. 88
Furthermore, in the strongest version of the test, substantiality is flunked
and an allocation is invalid for tax purposes if, after the tax effects of the
allocation are taken into account, no partner is worse off and at least one
partner is better off (both determined from a present value standpoint)
compared to the results had the special allocation not been made. 89
As noted, the default rule when there is no allocation specified by the
partners or the allocation does not have substantial economic effect is to
allocate the tax item in accordance with the PIP.9° In general, this rule
requires that the item be shared for tax purposes in the same manner that
the economic burden or benefit corresponding to the item is shared. In
determining what the economic share is, there is a starting presumption
that all items are shared equally on a per capita basis. 91 Among the fac-
tors that may be considered to rebut that presumption include the part-
ners' relative contributions to the partnership, their interests in economic
profits and losses, cash flow, and other non-liquidating distributions, and
their rights to distributions of capital upon liquidation.92 In certain cir-
cumstances, a partner's economic share may be determined by comparing
the partner's proceeds from a hypothetical complete liquidation of the
partnership at the end of the current year with the proceeds from a simi-
lar liquidation taking place at the end of the immediately preceding
year. 93
In general, nonrecourse deductions are deductions attributable to part-
nership liabilities for which "no partner ... bears the economic risk of
loss."'94 The allocation of such deductions cannot have economic effect




90. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (1994).
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1994).
92. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(ii).
93. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii)(b).
94. See id §§ 1.704-2(b)(1) and (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(2) (1991).
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because, by definition, no partner bears the economic burden that corre-
sponds to the tax deduction. 95 Hence, such deductions must be allocated
in accordance with the PIP. For partnership items like nonrecourse de-
ductions, which have no economic effect, the PIP is generally the overall
economic sharing arrangement of the partners.96 The regulations, how-
ever, provide a safe harbor test, which, if met, deems an allocation of
nonrecourse deductions to be in accordance with the PIP.97
The safe harbor contains four requirements. Two of them-the re-
quired maintenance and adjustment of, and respect for, capital accounts
in accordance with the economic effect test and a requirement that all
other material allocations be respected for tax purposes-are largely
mechanical in nature.98 A third rule requires the allocation of nonre-
course deductions to be reasonably consistent with an allocation having.
"substantial economic effect of some other significant partnership item
attributable to the property securing the nonrecourse liabilities" (the
"significant item consistency" rule).99 The regulations interpret this re-
quirement quite liberally, permitting a partner to be allocated a share of
nonrecourse deductions as low as the partner's lowest share, and as high
as the partner's highest share, of the significant other item relating to the
property. 10 0 The final condition of the safe harbor is the required alloca-
tion to a partner, at an appropriate point in the future, of an amount of
partnership income or gain equal to the nonrecourse deductions allocated
to such partner (the "minimum gain chargeback" provision). 1° 1
Under section 752, a partner's share in partnership liabilities is re-
flected in the adjusted basis of the partner's interest in the partnership. 102
The regulations under section 752 regarding a partner's share in recourse
and nonrecourse liabilities of a partnership have been coordinated with
the section 704(b) regulations to ensure that a partner who is validly allo-
cated a loss or deduction under the latter provisions has sufficient outside
basis to utilize such loss or deduction for tax purposes. 103
C. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT LAW
The regulatory interpretation of substantial economic effect basically
relies upon a capital account analysis of special allocations consistent with
the Tax Court's approach in Orrisch v. Commissioner.10 4 Under a capital
account analysis, the key question is whether the claimed tax allocation is
matched by a corresponding economic allocation as evidenced by the im-
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1992).
96. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i).
97. See id. § 1.704-2(e).
98. See id. § 1.704-2(e)(1) and (4). See WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 10-90 (3d ed. 1997).
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(e)(2) (as amended in 1992).
100. See id. § 1.704-2(m), ex. (1)(ii)-(iii) (as corrected by 62 Fed. Reg. 34,634 (1997)).
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(e)(3) and (f) (as amended in 1992).
102. See I.R.C. § 752 (1994).
103. Cf T.D. 8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180, 183.
104. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), affd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R. 2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
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pact of the allocation on the partners' capital accounts. The regulations
also include the substantiality test generally to ensure the predominance
of non-tax factors to support the claimed allocation.
Although a capital account analysis constitutes a superficially appeal-
ing method of evaluating the validity of allocation of partnership tax
items that have corresponding economic burdens and benefits, it is com-
pletely ineffective in testing allocations of other items, such as nonre-
course deductions, which lack such correspondence. As the regulations
state, the allocation of nonrecourse deductions cannot have economic ef-
fect because the economic burden associated with the deduction is not
borne by any partner. 10 5 It is for this reason that the regulations provide
a separate set of rules to test the validity of allocations of nonrecourse
deductions.
In 1983, the Treasury Department first proposed to treat allocations of
nonrecourse deductions as consistent with the PIP, and therefore valid, if,
in general, there was a minimum gain chargeback provision in the part-
nership agreement. In other words, an allocation of nonrecourse deduc-
tions to a partner would be respected as long as, at an appropriate point
in the future, an equal amount of partnership income or gain created by
the nonrecourse deductions would be allocated to such partner.10 6 This
rule was criticized by various commentators who argued that-
a partner's obligation to bear the burden of taxation on the minimum
gain that resulted from loss and deduction attributable to nonre-
course debt was not necessarily a good indication of a partner's inter-
est in the partnership. For example, under the proposed rule, so long
as the partnership agreement contained a minimum gain chargeback
provision, 100 percent of the loss and deduction attributable to non-
recourse debt could be allocated to a partner even though such part-
ner's interest in every other partnership item was substantially less
than 100 percent. 10 7
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1992).
106. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv), 48 Fed. Reg. 9871, 9876-77 (1983).
107. T.D. 8099, 1986-2 C.B. 84, 85; see also Committee on Partnerships of the N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on the Proposed Treasury Regulations Under Internal
Revenue Code Section 704(b), 19 TAX NOTES 1123, 1131-32 (1983) [hereinafter NYSBA
Report]; Letter from David R. Tillinghast, Committee on Taxation, Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, to John E. Chapoton, Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury (Tax Policy),
microfilmed on Tax Notes Microfiche Doc. No. 83-6492 (June 23, 1983) [hereinafter NYC
Bar Letter]; Letter from Richard B. Cohen to John E. Chapoton, Ass't Sec'y of the Treas-
ury (Tax Policy), reprinted in 19 TAX NOTES 917 (1983). Cf Howard G. Krane & Jeffrey T.
Sheffield, Beyond Orrisch: An Alternative View of Substantial Economic Effect under Sec-
tion 704(b)(2) Where Nonrecourse Debt Is Involved, 60 TAXES 937, 941-42 (1982) ("a gain-
chargeback alone is insufficient [for substantial economic effect] since it affects only tax
consequences and not the economic consequences of partnership operations"); Stephen G.
Utz, Partners in Crane: Partnership Investment and Economic Risk, 31 TAX NOTES 827,
845 (1986) ("rule [in proposed regulation] is an extraordinary partnership means of exag-
gerating for partners the putatively riskless tax benefits of Crane"). But see Ad Hoc Com-
mittee of Practicing Tax Lawyers, The Proposed Treasury Regulations on Partnership
Allocations: Section 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv) (Nonrecourse Debt), 19 TAX NOTES 1135 (1983)
[hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee Letter] (defending Treasury proposal).
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Indeed, an allocation of deductions accompanied by an offsetting alloca-
tion of future income would generally be treated as a transitory set of
allocations and invalid under the substantiality test.10 8 Thus, the original,
proposed safe harbor for an allocation of nonrecourse deductions would
likely have flunked both the economic effect and substantiality tests of
substantial economic effect had those tests been applied to it.109
The Treasury Department's response was to include in the final regula-
tions an additional requirement to the safe harbor: "The Treasury De-
partment ... agrees that a partnership should not be allowed to allocate
loss and deduction attributable to nonrecourse debt in the manner de-
scribed [in the example quoted above]. Accordingly, the proposed rule
has been modified to preclude this and similar types of tax-motivated ar-
rangements." 110 Treasury added the "significant item consistency" rule,
which requires that the allocation of nonrecourse deductions be reason-
ably consistent with an allocation having substantial economic effect of
some other significant partnership item attributable to the property se-
curing the nonrecourse liability.1 ' This rule, however, was accompanied
by the liberal interpretation of the meaning of "reasonably consistent."'"12
The significant item consistency rule has apparently not been effective
at limiting the sharing of nonrecourse deductions to arrangements con-
sistent with the partners' interest in the partnership. One commentator
has stated that
the ["significant item consistency"] limitation on allocations of tax
items attributable to third-party nonrecourse debt often leaves part-
nerships with a wide range of choices in making such allocations.
Even if the desired allocation of tax items attributable to third-party
nonrecourse debt is not supported by the other allocations that natu-
rally would occur by reason of the business arrangement of the part-
ners, it is possible in many circumstances to provide for a special
allocation of a significant partnership tax item in order to support the
desired allocation of tax items attributable to third-party nonre-
course debt.113
Thus, current law does not seem to be significantly different from the
1983 Treasury proposal, which according to the Treasury, permitted tax-
108. An offsetting allocation of future gain would survive a substantiality challenge be-
cause of the regulatory presumption that property value declines with property basis. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c) (as amended in 1994).
109. Cf Susan Pace Hamill, Final Regulations Concerning Liabilities Join Substantial
Economic Effect Rules, 9 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 99, 117 (1992) (minimum gain chargeback
provisions not subject to scrutiny under transitory allocation rules or other substantiality
provisions). The existence of a gain chargeback provision in Orrisch was not sufficient to
protect the taxpayer's special allocation of depreciation deductions from the successful IRS
challenge.
110. T.D. 8099, 1986-2 C.B. 84, 85-86.
111. See id. at 85.
112. See id.
113. Brannan, supra note 73, at 122-23; see also Sanford C. Presant & Leslie H.
Loffman, The Final Partnership Nonrecourse Debt Allocation Regulations, 65 TAXES 67, 78-
79 (1987) (describing various planning techniques for satisfying the significant item consis-
tency requirement).
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motivated sharing arrangements. 114
The failure to impose significant restrictions on the allocation of nonre-
course deductions is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that allo-
cations of partnership items must have substantial economic effect or else
be consistent with the PIP." 5 Indeed, under current law, the rules re-
garding the allocation of nonrecourse deductions are less restrictive than
those relating to the allocation of other partnership items, such as part-
nership income, gain, and deductions and loss attributable to equity capi-
tal investments or recourse indebtedness. Given the fact that allocations
of nonrecourse deductions "often are highly tax-motivated,"" 6 the ex-
isting state of affairs seems nonsensical. 117 It also allows taxpayers
through a partnership investment to obtain more favorable tax results
than those available from direct investment." 8
The significance of the inadequacy of current law is heightened by the
growth of LLCs and similar forms of business organizations that provide
limited liability protection to all owners of the entity. For one thing, all
deductions attributable to liabilities incurred by such business entities
subsequent to formation constitute "nonrecourse deductions"-even de-
ductions attributable to debt, which is nominally recourse at the entity
level-because no owner of the entity ultimately bears the economic bur-
den corresponding to such deductions. 1 9 Thus, the scope and resulting
114. See Brannan, supra note 73, at 123 ("The current system imposes no meaningful
limitation on the ability of partnerships to make tax-motivated allocations of tax items
attributable to third-party nonrecourse debt"); cf. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S.
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW 4-63 (1994) ("A
special allocation of loss or deduction items, coupled with an income offset or gain
chargeback, will therefore produce a pure deferral advantage for the member receiving the
allocation, since no economic loss actually occurred. This deferral may create substantial
tax savings.")
115. See NYSBA Report, supra note 107, at 1132.
116. Brannan, supra note 73, at 123; see Jonathan B. Dubitzky, Rethinking Retroactive
Partnership Allocations, 52 TAX NOTES 1533, 1540 (1991) ("We all know that nonrecourse
deductions typically will be apportioned before the fact with tax considerations the only
relevant factor .... ).
117. See NYC Bar Letter, supra note 107, at 3 ("It is ... highly irrational to permit
allocations based on nonrecourse debt which would not be allowed if based on recourse
debt .... Allocations based on nonrecourse debt have the least economic restraints and
should ... be the most circumscribed.").
118. See Sherwin Kamin, Partnership Income and Loss Allocations Before and After the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, 30 TAX LAW. 667, 693 (1977) ("[H]ad each partner owned his
interest in common, his Crane benefit would have been limited to his percentage of owner-
ship. It is only in following the partnership mechanics that a partner can be allowed a
greater proportion of the loss than would be justified by his investment or interest in the
partnership profits."); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1995).
119. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 112, at 4-64 to 4-65; see also Kenneth
Heller & James Boyd, Partnership Liabilities: IRS Interpretation Helpful but Further Gui-
dance Needed, 13 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 243, 252 (1996); Snoe, supra note 65, at 1916; cf.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(e)(2), -1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(4)(ii) (1988), reprinted in 1989-1 C.B.
180, 188 (according to prior version of regulations, "if an entity that is treated as a partner-
ship for federal income tax purposes is organized and operated under a local law which
provides that none of the members of that entity is liable for its debts and other obliga-
tions, then all the liabilities of that entity will generally constitute [nonrecourse] liabili-
ties"). The reference in the text to "nonrecourse deductions" does not include deductions
of an LLC attributable to entity debt to which an LLC member bears the economic risk of
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importance of the current law rule is increased. 120
A further problem involves the interpretation of the "significant item
consistency" rule in the context of the allocation of LLC deductions.
Both the significant item consistency rule and the minimum gain
chargeback provision were drafted in contemplation of nonrecourse fi-
nancing which is secured by specific pieces of the business entity's prop-
erty. For example, the significant item consistency rule requires the
allocation of nonrecourse deductions to be reasonably consistent with an
allocation having "substantial economic effect of some other significant
partnership item attributable to the property securing the nonrecourse
liabilities."'12 1 But it is not clear how such rules should be applied where
nonrecourse deductions arise as a result of the limited liability protection
offered to all owners of the enterprise itself, rather than in the traditional
setting.
One reasonable interpretation is to treat for this purpose any LLC debt
as a "floating lien" with a security interest in all of the assets of the enter-
prise.'2 2 If this were the rule, then the significant item consistency rule
would be converted into one where the allocation of nonrecourse deduc-
tions must be reasonably consistent with any significant item of the enter-
prise having substantial economic effect. Given the liberal interpretation
in the regulations of "reasonably consistent," such a rule would seem to
permit virtually any allocation arrangement desired by the parties. As
with the original, unsatisfactory 1983 Treasury proposal, the only remain-
ing "restraint" of current law would be to require an appropriate
chargeback of income or gain to the partner allocated the nonrecourse
deductions.
Finally, allocation of LLC deductions creates various technical
problems under the regulations. In general, these problems are caused by
the failure of the regulations to envision the possibility of recourse debt
of an entity being classified as nonrecourse debt for purposes of the allo-
cation rules, due to the limited liability protection afforded the owners of
the entity. 2 3
For example, the concept of "minimum gain" in the regulations is
based on the Tufts holding that upon the disposition of property secured
by a nonrecourse liability, the amount realized includes the full amount
of the liability, regardless of the value of the encumbered assets at the
loss, such as debt for which the member is the creditor or a guarantor. Deductions attribu-
table to such debt, termed "partner nonrecourse deductions" in the regulations, must gen-
erally be allocated to the member who bears the economic risk of loss. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-2(b)(4), -2(i) (as amended in 1992).
120. The utilization of nonrecourse deductions allocated to a taxpayer may, however,
be limited by sections 465 and 469.
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(e)(2) (as amended in 1992).
122. See Brannan, supra note 73, at 125; Bryan P. Collins et al., Allocating Debt-Fi-
nanced Losses of an LLC under Section 704(b), 2 J. LLCs 135, 137 (1995). Cf Heller &
Boyd, supra note 119, at 259-61.
123. See Clayton S. Reynolds, Treatment of Recourse Liabilities in the Context of a Lim-
ited Liability Company, 74 TAXES 397 (1996).
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time of disposition. 124 Thus, for instance, if property financed by nonre-
course debt is depreciated, there is ordinarily a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the amount of nonrecourse deductions and the future
minimum amount of gain to be recognized upon disposition of the prop-
erty. But if property subject to a recourse liability is disposed of, the lia-
bility is included in amount realized only if another person agrees to pay
the liability.125 Hence, the one-to-one correspondence between nonre-
course deductions and minimum gain that is relied upon in the regulatory
scheme may no longer be present. 126
D. SOME IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Because the economic burden associated with nonrecourse deductions
is not borne by any partner, the allocation of such deductions cannot be
made to have economic effect through a capital account analysis.1 27
Therefore, the only appropriate rule consistent with the statute is to re-
quire that such deductions be allocated in accordance with the overall
economic sharing arrangement of the partners. Current law imposes this
general requirement, but then relaxes it through its safe harbor provision.
Neither the significant item consistency rule nor the other conditions of
the safe harbor adequately restricts allocations of nonrecourse deductions
to arrangements that are consistent with the overall economic shares of
the partners.
Determining economic shares in any given case, however, is a difficult
task. In certain business arrangements, the relative capital contributions
of the partners, the manner in which they share economic profits, losses,
or cash flow, their rights to distributions, or other factors may be indica-
tive of the true economic shares of the partners. In contrast, in other
arrangements, one or more of the same factors may be completely irrele-
vant. Economic shares can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.
To provide some degree of certainty and predictability for taxpayers,
however, it might be possible to create a few elective safe harbors which
define the likely "overall economic shares" in certain common business
arrangements. Some of the safe harbors might be created by statute with
the rest promulgated through regulations. The regulatory safe harbors,
however, should attempt to identify, and limit the permissible allocation
scheme to, the overall economic shares of the partners. Thus, for exam-
124. See Commissioner v. Tufts., 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1), -
2(a)(4)(i), -2(b) (1980).
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(ii) (1996).
126. The definition of minimum gain also contemplates the disposition of the property
subject to the nonrecourse liability whereas debt of an LLC may not be secured by any
property unless the "floating lien" assumption is made. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(d)(1);
Collins et al., supra note 122, at 137. One possible effect of this technical problem, if left
uncorrected, is to postpone the time of the minimum gain chargeback requirement for
nonrecourse deductions of an LLC. See Reynolds, supra note 123, at 402.
127. Once again, although this discussion refers generally to "partners" and "partner-
ships," it is intended to apply more broadly to any business firms, which are taxed as
conduits.
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ple, it would not be appropriate to include as a regulatory safe harbor a
requirement such as the significant item consistency rule.
One possible safe harbor would be to permit an allocation of nonre-
course deductions that is consistent with the relative capital contributions
of the partners. This option should probably be limited to cases in which
the aggregate capital contributions and the recourse indebtedness of the
partnership represent more than some nominal amount, such as at least
ten percent, of the total capitalization of the partnership, and the partners
do not expect the partnership to earn substantial profits in excess of a
reasonable return on the capital contributions. Where capital contribu-
tions and recourse debt represent more than a nominal amount of the
total capitalization and the partners anticipate the earning of profits con-
sistent with a reasonable return on such contributions, the capital contri-
bution share would seem to constitute the likely economic sharing
arrangement of the partners.'28 Hence, it would be appropriate to permit
nonrecourse deductions to be allocated in a manner consistent with those
shares.
For example, assume A and B contribute $20,000 and $40,000, respec-
tively, to partnership AB, which purchases an office building for $600,000.
The balance of the purchase price is financed through nonrecourse debt.
The aggregate capital contributions by the partners constitute at least ten
percent of the total capitalization of the partnership. Therefore, assum-
ing the partners do not expect the partnership to earn substantial profits
in excess of a reasonable return on their capital contributions, they might
be permitted to allocate any nonrecourse deductions 1/3 to A and 2/3 to
B.
Now assume the same facts as above but that some years after owning
and operating the office building, partnership AB is in need of some addi-
tional capital to finance some improvements to the property. C agrees to
contribute $25,000 to the partnership in exchange for a 1/4 interest in the
partnership after the interests of A and B are booked up to $25,000 and
$50,000, respectively. Assuming the aggregate capital contributions by
the partners, including the booked-up amounts of A and B, represent at
least ten percent of the total capitalization of the partnership and the
partners still do not expect to earn substantial profits in excess of a rea-
sonable return on their capital contributions, they might, under the first
safe harbor, be entitled to allocate any nonrecourse deductions 1/4 to A
and C and 1/2 to B.
A second possible safe harbor would be to permit the allocation of
nonrecourse deductions in accordance with the sharing arrangement for
the expected, residual economic profits of the business. Obviously, this
128. See Brannan, supra note 73, at 123 n.l; see also Letter from Lawrence Katz, Piper
& Marbury, to John E. Chapoton, Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury, Ronald A. Pearlman, Dep-
uty Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury, and Mark L. Kuller, Assoc. Tax Legislative Counsel of the
Treasury, reprinted in 20 TAx NoTs 687 (1983); cf Ad Hoc Committee Letter, supra note
107, at 1138.
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option should be allowed only if there exists a reasonable expectation of
significant residual profits at the time of the election. In that circum-
stance, the manner in which the partners propose to share such residual
profits may constitute the likely economic sharing arrangement of the
partners. 129 If this option is permitted, the statute of limitations for as-
sessing a deficiency resulting from a misallocation of nonrecourse deduc-
tions should probably be held open until some period following the actual
realization of residual economic profits by the firm, to ensure that the
allocation of nonrecourse deductions is consistent with the actual sharing
of such profits. 130
For example, assume developer D joins together with E and F to form
partnership DEF to acquire, develop, and manage various properties.
The partners agree to allocate initial losses one percent to D, fifty percent
to E, and forty-nine percent to F, and to allocate profits in the same man-
ner until all prior losses have been offset. Thereupon, the partners agree
to allocate profits twenty percent to D, forty percent to E, and forty per-
cent to F. Assuming that at the time of the election, there exists a reason-
able expectation of significant residual profits to be allocated 20/40/40,
the parties might be allowed under the second safe harbor to allocate any
nonrecourse deductions in the same manner. In that circumstance, the
20/40/40 division likely represents the real economic deal of the
parties. 131
Now suppose the same facts as above except that after all prior losses
have been recouped, the parties agree to share any partnership income or
gain differently. Any operating income of the partnership will be shared
forty percent by D, thirty percent by E, and thirty percent by F, and any
gain from the sale of the property will be shared ten percent by D, forty-
five percent by E, and forty-five percent by F. If, at the time of the elec-
tion, there exists a reasonable expectation of significant residual profits
and the parties reasonably anticipate those profits to be evenly divided
between operating income and gain, then the parties might be allowed to
allocate nonrecourse deductions twenty-five percent to D (50% x 40% +
50% x 10%), 37.5% to E, and 37.5% to F.132
129. See NYSBA Report, supra note 107, at 1133; NYC Bar letter, supra note 107, at 4-
6. Cf. Kamin, supra note 116, at 692; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956) (now superseded);
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) (1997); ALl 1984 Subchapter K Proposals, supra note 40, at
236-37 (example illustrating nonrecourse deductions being allocated in accordance with
relative capital contributions and residual profit shares of partners).
130. Where significant residual profits are not expected until some time in the future,
this rule is intended to prevent a change in the sharing ratio of such profits from one
designed to support the initial allocation of nonrecourse deductions to one representing
the true economic share agreed upon by the parties.
131. Cf. Thomas J. McMahon, Coordinating Partners' Profit and Loss Allocations with
Economic Sharing Agreements, 10 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 220, 228-29 (1993). If no signifi-
cant residual profits are expected, the 1/50/49 sharing arrangement may constitute the eco-
nomic deal of the parties. Cf ALl 1984 Subchapter K Proposals, supra note 40, at 239.
132. Cf NYC Bar Letter, supra note 107, at 6. Obviously, how "reasonable" these
various expectations are will be one of the difficult questions that would have to be re-
solved. A more sophisticated though more complicated approach would take into account
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It would seem that any partnership should be permitted to make only
one election. For example, a partnership probably should not be allowed
to allocate nonrecourse deductions consistent with relative capital contri-
butions for certain years and with residual economic profits for other
years, even though the terms of those safe harbors can otherwise be satis-
fied by the partnership. The same rule should apply to any additional
elections, which are authorized by regulation.
If options similar to those described above are allowed, they should
replace only the significant item consistency rule of current law. All
other aspects of the current law safe harbor, including in particular the
minimum gain chargeback provision, should be retained. Thus, a partner
who is allocated nonrecourse deductions must still be allocated an offset-
ting amount of future partnership income or gain at the same time and in
the same manner provided under current law.
If no valid election is in effect for any year, then the allocation of non-
recourse deductions would have to be consistent with the overall eco-
nomic sharing arrangement of the partners for that year, as measured by
the PIP. This determination would be made on a case-by-case basis, tak-
ing into account all of the factors identified in current law.
Finally, conforming changes should be made to section 752 to ensure
that a partner who is validly allocated nonrecourse deductions under one
of the options described above would have sufficient outside basis to util-
ize such deductions for tax purposes. In addition, certain technical
changes should be made to the regulations to make them applicable to
nonrecourse deductions of business entities which provide limited liabil-
ity protection for all owners of the entity. For example, all debt of such
entities, whether recourse or nonrecourse, might be treated for tax pur-
poses (including for purposes of sections 704(b), 752, and 1001) as "non-
recourse" debt secured by all of the property of the entity. Calculation of
minimum gain would then generally be the difference between the aggre-
gate debt of the entity and the aggregate adjusted basis in its assets. 133
E. SUMMARY
This part of the Article has illustrated the difficulty of taxing private
business firms as conduits in a post-check-the-box world. A conduit tax
system would ordinarily require the firm's debt and any tax items arising
from that debt to be allocated among the firm's owners. But if the firm,
such as an LLC or a corporation, provides all of its owners with limited
liability protection, no owner bears the economic burden of the debt hav-
ing to be repaid. Thus, there is no economic baseline available against
which the required allocation for tax purposes can easily be tested.
The problem described is similar to the allocation of a firm's nonre-
course deductions under current law. Unfortunately, the current law
the anticipated timing of the profits, the likelihood that they will be realized, and the dis-
counting of all items to present value. See Krane & Sheffield, supra note 107, at 947-50.
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(m), ex. 2; Heller & Boyd, supra note 119, at 259-61.
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rules for allocating nonrecourse deductions do not adequately preclude
purely tax-motivated sharing arrangements of those deductions. More-
over, the rules were not drafted to apply to debt and tax items belonging
to a firm all of whose owners have limited liability protection. Yet as a
result of the check-the-box regulations, such cases will become increas-
ingly common.
A possible improvement would be to require all nonrecourse deduc-
tions to be allocated among the owners of the firm in accordance with
their overall economic sharing arrangement. Safe harbors might then be
provided in select circumstances to give taxpayers some degree of cer-
tainty and predictability. One possible option would be to allocate the
deductions consistent with the relative capital contributions of the own-
ers. Another possibility would be to permit the deductions to be allo-
cated in accordance with the sharing arrangement for the expected,
residual economic profits of the business. The purpose of the safe
harbors would be to provide a relatively easy to administer rule applica-
ble to common business arrangements. Allocations of nonrecourse de-
ductions in other, more complicated arrangements would then have to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
Another possible way to deal with the issue is to revisit whether entity
debt and tax items arising from that debt should be allocated among the
owners of a business firm where the all of the owners are provided with
limited liability protection. Basic conduit principles would seem to re-
quire that allocation to be made, yet if the administrative cost of doing so
is too great, perhaps some deviation from those principles is justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the check-the-box regulations, the IRS has simplified the eligibil-
ity criteria for determining how many private businesses will be taxed.
The rules could not be much simpler: for the most part, the state law
characteristics and business organization form of the business are irrele-
vant in determining how the business will be taxed. In part II of this
Article, I have suggested that whether a firm is incorporated under state
law will soon be a similarly irrelevant factor for tax purposes, either be-
cause of evolving state law developments or amendments of the federal
tax statute to permit corporations to "check the box" as well. I have also
questioned whether firms should be distinguished for tax purposes based
upon the public trading of their ownership interests.
But exactly what has this newly liberalized eligibility policy entitled all
of these firms to do? That question represents the "dark side" of the
check-the-box regulations. At present, they are entitled to choose how
they are to be taxed, and to choose among Subchapters C, S, or K. Why
should they have a choice, and why should they have these particular
choices? In a post-check-the-box world where state law characteristics
and business organization form are no longer relevant for tax purposes,
there does not seem to be any rational answer to these questions. But the
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genie is out of the bottle; there is little chance of reversion to a more
restrictive eligibility scheme in which there is some effort to match up
firms with the tax operating rule systems available under current law.
Thus, whether the new regulations represent real improvement and sim-
plification, or merely an ironic surprise, must await revision and reform of
the tax operating rules themselves.
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